**STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT**

# FROM POLICIES TO PROCEDURES THE NEXT STEP IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS

## BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

# From Policies to Procedures

# The Next Step in Information Operations

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# ABSTRACT

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An effective information operations campaign depends on the
successful integration of information operations elements and
capabilities into the joint force commander's overall operation
plan. Information operations planning must begin at the
earliest stage of a joint force commander's peacetime campaign
planning and must provide a basis for subsequent information
operations in crisis and/or conflict. Information operations
planning for a particular military operation can occur as part
of the deliberate planning cycle or in response to a crisis;
therefore, this paper addresses information operations planning
requirements in relation to the deliberate and crisis action
planning processes. It also discusses methods of planning,
integrating and executing information operations and provides
some tactics, techniques, and procedures in an effort to link
information operations policy and doctrine to information
operations execution.

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# POLICIES TO PROCEDURES

> The joint campaign should fully exploit the information differential, that is, the superior access to and ability to effectively employ information on the strategic, operational, and tactical situations which advanced US technologies provide our forces.
>
> —Joint Pub 1

Rapidly advancing information-based technologies and an increasingly competitive global environment have thrust information into center stage in society, government, and warfare in the 21st Century. Information and information-based technologies significantly impact warfighting across the range of military operations, and all levels of war. They are pervasive and affect every facet of warfighting-from planning, deployment, and sustainment to the weapon systems employed by joint task force commanders. In order to capitalize on the growing sophistication, connectivity, and reliance on information technology, the United States Armed Forces has developed and is pursuing a strategy called Information Operations.[1]

Information Operations (IO) has emerged as a key joint warfighting mission area and is quickly becoming a predominant factor in the future of the United States Armed Forces. Since its inception, there has been an abundance of discussions, opinions, and point papers. Although great strides have been

made with regards to writing IO policy and doctrine, little has
been done to translate this IO vision into practical processes
and procedures. Publications such as Department of Defense
Directive (DODD) S-3600.1, "Information Operations," and
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3210.01A,
"Joint Information Operations Policy," outline general IO policy
and delineate some specific responsibilities for Department of
Defense (DOD) components, but they fail to provide a detailed
method with which to plan and conduct IO.

Joint Pub 3-13, "Joint Doctrine for Information
Operations," provides further guidance with regards to
implementing information operations at the joint/combatant
commander level. In fact, it suggests a method (called the IO
Cell)[2] by which a joint force or combatant commander can organize
his staff in an effort to plan and execute IO properly. It also
discusses the development of Appendix 3 (Information Warfare) to
Annex C (Operations) of a campaign plan, operation plan,
contingency plan, functional plan, or operation order.[3]
Unfortunately, Joint Pub 3-13, which has been in draft form for
over 2 years now, is still the subject of intense debate and is
unlikely to be published anytime in the near future.

Even with the approval and release of Joint Pub 3-13, there
is still a void between these publications and the
implementation and execution of IO. Therefore, the intent of

this paper is to provide a method of planning, integrating and
executing IO and, through the use of some tactics, techniques,
and procedures (TTPs), to provide a link between IO doctrine and
IO execution.

## INFORMATION OPERATIONS DEFINITION

According to Joint Pub 3-13, "Information operations means
actions taken to affect adversary information and information
systems while defending one's own information and information
systems.  Information operations require the close, continuous
integration of offensive and defensive capabilities and
activities, as well as effective design, integration, and
interaction of Command and Control (C2) with intelligence
support.  Information operations are conducted through the
integration of many capabilities and related activities.  Major
IO capabilities include, but are not limited to, operation
security (OPSEC), psychological operations (PSYOP), military
deception, electronic warfare (EW), physical destruction, and
computer network attack (CNA).  IO-related activities include,
but are not limited to public affairs (PA) and civil affairs
(CA) activities."[4]  But there is more to information operations
than just this definition.

Information operations comprise a strategy that integrates
the US military element of national power with all other

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elements of national power to achieve certain objectives. The stated goal of IO is to secure peacetime national security objectives, deter conflict, protect DOD information and information systems, and to shape the information environment. If deterrence fails, information operations seek to achieve US information superiority to attain specific objectives against potential adversaries in time of crisis and/or conflict. In order to accomplish these goals, IO seeks to affect a human decision-maker to the degree that an adversary will cease actions threatening to US national security interests. At the tactical and operational levels, information operations target and protect information, information transfer links, information gathering and processing nodes, and human decisional interaction with information systems.[5]

Whether in peace or crisis, IO can help deter adversaries from initiating actions detrimental to the interests of the United States or its allies. If carefully conceived, coordinated and executed, IO can make an important contribution to defusing crisis; reducing the period of confrontation; and enhancing the impact of informational, diplomatic, economic, and military efforts. IO can also forestall or eliminate the need to employ forces in a combat situation, and can help prepare the battlefield during time of conflict.[6]

# INFORMATION OPERATIONS PLANNING FUNDAMENTALS

The planning and execution of information operations within any campaign will vary depending upon the purpose of the operation, commander's intent, and the desired end state. However, in that IO is to be an integral part of any campaign, it stands to reason that the same basic fundamentals of campaign planning listed in Joint Pub 5-0, "Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations," apply to IO planning as well.[7]

The synchronization and integration of IO requires clear national strategic guidance. The National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, shaped by and oriented on national security policies, must provide strategic direction to combatant commanders. This direction is required to ensure combatant commanders' IO planning and execution supports national objectives. Combatant commanders and subordinate Joint Force Commanders (JFCs), in turn, must consider the strategic environment during the planning process in order to determine potential constraints and opportunities. Once identified, these constraints and opportunities will serve as the "boundaries" for IO planning, and will help to identify limitations based on policy, as well as, help to reduce the uncertainty associated with IO planning.[8]

The identification of the enemy strategic and operational centers of gravity and guidance for defeating them is

fundamental to IO campaign planning.  In addition, planners must

also identify vulnerabilities, devise required tasks and sub-

tasks, and select the methods and the means to exploit these

vulnerabilities in order to achieve the JFC's objectives.  The

means or capabilities used by the JFC will vary from organic

non-compartmented capabilities to national level capabilities.

This requires the planners to identify Service, joint, and

interagency IO capabilities available to the JFC for use in

developing an IO plan and in facilitating an effective

capability-to-target match.[9]

## INFORMATION OPERATIONS PLANNING COORDINATION

To be successful, IO should be an integral part of all

joint military operations.  This requires extensive planning and

coordination among many elements of the joint headquarters,

component staffs, and other United States Government (USG)

departments and agencies.  In order to ensure that information

operations are fully integrated with other portions of operation

and campaign plans, the organizational structure designed and

used to plan and coordinate IO should be flexible enough to

accommodate a variety of planning and operational circumstances.

How the staff is organized to plan and coordinate IO is the

Joint Force Commander's responsibility.  Since various staffs

have diverse structures, scope of responsibilities, and

supporting infrastructures, there is no single "correct" way to organize for planning and executing IO. The combatant commander and subordinate JFCs should determine the composition, authority, and duties of the IO planning effort and tailor their organizations according to unique mission requirements. There are a number of ways to organize in order to ensure that the IO effort is fully coordinated. Some of the options available include (but are not limited to) planning meetings, informal coordination among staff elements, and standing IO cells. The use of the term "IO cell" in this paper can accommodate any of these options.[10]

An IO cell is formed from select representatives from each staff element, component, and supporting agencies responsible for integrating IO capabilities and related activities. Using the planning process specified by the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) to carry out planning responsibilities, this cell merges IO capabilities and related activities into a synergistic plan. The IO cell coordinates the efforts of the staff elements and components represented in the cell in order to facilitate the detailed support necessary to plan and execute IO. The IO cell, along with the Joint Force Commander's staff, develops and promulgates guidance and plans for IO and integrates the broad range of potential IO actions and activities that help contribute to the JFC's desired end

state. The actual composition of the IO cell may vary based on the overall mission of the joint force, the role of IO in accomplishing the JFC's objectives, and the adversary's or potential adversary's capabilities to conduct IO.[11]

## INFORMATION OPERATIONS PLANNING METHODOLOGY

The joint operation planning process (Figure 1) entails development of plans for potential crises involving military forces that can reasonably be expected in a Combatant Commander's (CINC's) area of responsibility. There are three categories of planning associated with the scope of joint operation planning: campaign planning, deliberate planning, and crisis action planning. Campaign planning is not a structured formal process like deliberate and crisis action planning. However, campaign planning principles apply to both deliberate and crisis action planning. In fact, campaign planning helps facilitate a transition from deliberate to crisis action planning. If the national objectives, mission, available forces, and actual threat become evident, campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning but is normally not completed until after the NCA selects a specific course of action in response to the imminent crisis during crisis action planning of a specific plan. So if the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate

planning and continues through crisis action planning, thus

unifying both planning processes.[12]



Figure 1. Joint Operation Planning Processes[13]

The same is true for information operations planning. IO

planning is accomplished in all three types of planning

processes: campaign, deliberate and crisis action planning. In

order to successfully integrate IO into the JFC's overall

operations plan, IO planning must be broad-based and encompass

employment of all available IO resources--joint, Service,

interagency, and multinational. IO planning must begin at the

earliest stage of a JFC's peacetime campaign planning and

provide a basis for subsequent IO in crisis and/or conflict.

Armed Forces Staff College Pub 12, "Joint Information

Warfare Staff Officer's Guide," talks of a peacetime IO campaign

plan.[14] Although the concept of a separate IO campaign plan has

some merit to it, this paper will focus on incorporating IO into

the JFC's overall campaign plan using the current joint

operations planning processes; more specifically, using the

deliberate and crisis action planning processes.

## INFORMATION OPERATIONS PLANNING AS A PART OF JOPES

All elements and capabilities of IO must be carefully

planned.  Whether IO planning for a particular military

operation occurs as part of the deliberate planning cycle or in

response to a crisis, the key to building a successful IO plan

is the integration of the elements and capabilities of IO (both

offensive and defensive).  Detailed IO planning and integration

is accomplished by organizations and personnel charged with

planning the various elements of IO using the JOPES planning

processes (Figure 2) and other key staff and support personnel.

IO plans should be developed in support of the JFC's overall

operational plan.  To do this, IO planning should occur

simultaneously with operation planning.  Chairman Joint Chiefs

of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.03, "Joint Operation Planning and

Execution System, Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance" and

Armed Forces Staff College Pub 1, "The Joint Staff Officer's

Guide," are the operational planner's guide to developing

operation plans and are the doctrinal basis used for this

paper.[15]

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Figure 2.  Joint Planning Functional Alignment[16]

## INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND DELIBERATE PLANNING

In order to show the relationship between IO planning and deliberate planning, it is necessary to look specifically into the five phases of the deliberate planning process (Figure 2), and to describe what the IO cell is doing within each phase as well as what it is doing in relation to the other staff elements. In addition, any unique IO cell procedures and products used throughout the various phases will be highlighted. Table 1 summarizes what will be discussed and provides a general guide to IO planning as an integral part of the JOPES deliberate planning process at the combatant command level.

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| PLANNING PHASE | JOPES | IO CELL PLANNING ACTION | IO CELL PLANNING OUTCOME |
|---|---|---|---|
| PHASE I | Initiation | Notify IO cell members of planning requirement. | N/A |
| PHASE II | Concept Development | | |
| Step 1 | Mission Analysis | Conduct IO systems analysis, identify RFIs needed for mission planning, & assist in developing CINC objectives. | Restated mission statement, CINC objectives, & RFIs from an IO perspective. |
| Step 2 | Planning Guidance | Assist in development of CINC's IO planning guidance, determine IO objectives & sub-objectives, & ensure they are included in COAs. | IO planning guidance & IO objectives and sub-objectives. |
| Step 3 | Staff Estimates | Develop IO estimate of supportability and support the development of intelligence, operations, and communications staff estimates. | IO staff estimate (if required) & IO portions of other staff estimates. |
| Step 4 | Commander's Estimate | Assist in comparing COAs from an IO perspective and transforming staff estimates into a Commander's estimate. | IO portion of Commander's Estimate. |
| Step 5 | CINC's Strategic Concept | Assist in developing the selected COA into a CONOPs, and determine applicable elements and tasks. | IO portion of CINC's Strategic Concept, Objective to Task Model, Priority of Effort and Synchronization Matrix. |
| Step 6 | CJCS Concept Review | Assist in the IO aspect of CJCS Concept Review as required. | IO portion of operational concept approved by CJCS. |
| PHASE III | Plan Development | Develop complete IO plan and coordinate with appropriate staff sections, operational units, and supporting agencies for each of the IO elements. | IW Appendix (with associated tabs) and inputs to Annexes B, F, G, K, & S as required. |
| PHASE IV | Plan Review | Modify/refine plan as necessary. | Approved IO Appendixes and Annexes. |
| PHASE V | Supporting Plans | Coordinate/assist subordinate units and supporting agencies in preparing their own IO plans. Ensure TPFDD supports IO plan. | Completed subordinate and supporting agencies' supporting plans. IO plan supported by TPFDD. |

Table 1.  IO Planning Related to Deliberate Planning[17]

PHASE I (INITIATION)

In this phase, the CINC receives a planning task and guidance from the CJCS, is apportioned major forces and strategic lift assets available for planning, and directs his staff to begin planning. Other than to notify IO cell members of a planning requirement, there are no other actions or products required in this phase.

PHASE II (CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT)

The concept development phase can be seen as an orderly series of six steps. In this phase, the mission is analyzed in order to develop a more concise mission statement. Next, planning guidance is given to the staff and from this guidance they prepare initial staff estimates of potential courses of action (COAs). The CINC, in turn, gives his estimate of the various COAs and selects one for further planning. The course of action selected by the CINC is then expanded and developed into a proposed concept of operations. These first five steps take the staff through a problem-solving process to develop the CINC's Strategic Concept. In the sixth step, the CJCS reviews the CINC's Strategic Concept. Once approved, the CINC's Strategic Concept then becomes the concept of operations for the plan. The six steps cannot be conducted separately or in the simple sequence listed. The dividing line between steps is

sometimes hard to see and staff work done in one step can often affect work being done in others. It is in Phase II of the deliberate planning process that the IO cell does the preponderance of it's planning and work; therefore, it will also be the phase in which most of this paper's TTPs will be presented.[18]

The purpose of step 1 (Mission Analysis) is to analyze the assigned tasks in order to develop a concise mission statement and to prepare guidance for subordinates. During this step the IO cell should meet to consider the scope of the planning problem and evaluate what information is required to develop an IO plan. Initial steps should include tasking IO cell members to identify appropriate sections of completed operation plans and search for relevant historical data, such as in the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) data base. Cell members should conduct IO systems analysis, determine information-planning requirements, and assist in the development of CINC objectives.[19] The products produced in this step are requests for information (RFIs) from an IO perspective, a restated mission statement and CINC objectives (Figure 3). Although several objectives can be derived from a mission statement, only two are depicted here for illustrative purposes. Of these two CINC objectives, one (Deter Country X Aggression)

has been selected for further development, and it will be used

to build a complete "Objective to Task Model."[20]



When directed by the NCA, CINCXXXCOM will deploy forces in order to deter Country X's aggression and to deny it's ability to employ WMD, to protect LOCs and SLOCs, to protect CONUS, to control illegal migration, and to defend XXX Naval Base in order to protect U.S. lives and to preserve U.S. interests there.

**CINC's Restated Mission**

DETER COUNTRY X AGGRESSION

DEFEND XXX NAVAL BASE

**CINC Objective(s)**

Figure 3.  CINC Objectives

In step 2 (Planning Guidance), the CINC issues his

guidance, informs all planning participants, and develops

tentative COAs.  During this step, the IO cell assists in the

development of the CINC's IO planning guidance.  The IO officer

should coordinate with the J-3 and other operational planners to

recommend appropriate IO objectives and sub-objectives (based on

the restated mission and CINC objectives developed in step 1) to

ensure that they are included in the various COAs.  In this

example, some IO objectives (Figure 4) that could assist in

achieving the CINC's desired end state, were developed from the CINC's objective of "Deter Country X Aggression." Once again, there could be several IO objectives that could support each CINC objective, but only two were listed here for the purpose of this paper.



Figure 4. Information Operations Objectives

Just as there can be a variety of IO objectives that can support a CINC objective, there are also numerous IO sub-objectives that can support the larger more broad IO objectives. Thus, there is a branching out effect as CINC objectives, IO objectives, and IO sub-objectives are further developed. Continuing with the model, some IO sub-objectives (Figure 5),

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that are more specific in nature and that will further define

the method in which the mission can be accomplished, have been

chosen from one of the IO objectives. "Disrupt C2," "Disrupt

IADs," and "Reduce Morale" then become IO sub-objectives or

alternative means of achieving the IO objective of "Reduce

Country X's Military Leadership's Confidence in its Armed

Forces." This process of selecting IO objectives and subsequent

sub-objectives is currently being automated with the Army's Land

Information Warfare Activity's (LIWA) IO work station and the

Joint Command and Control Warfare Center's (JC2WC) Athena

program.[21] Once completed, these IO planning tool initiatives

will greatly enhance the IO cell's ability to execute IO.



Figure 5. Information Operations Sub-objectives

Step 3 (Staff Estimates) determines supportability of the tentative COAs by appropriate staff directorates. Once the CINC has determined IO objectives and provided IO planning guidance, the IO officer and the "element" representatives in the cell should develop an IO estimate of supportability. In addition, they should work with the J-2, J-5, J-6, and other J-3 planners in the development of their estimates as well. Service and functional component representatives from the IO cell may also assist in the development of the staff estimate by providing information about the capabilities and/or limitations of subordinate units.[22]

In step 4 (Commander's Estimate) the IO cell assists in comparing COAs from an IO perspective. In the CINC's process of reviewing and altering (if necessary) the staff estimate to make it the "Commander's Estimate," the IO cell should assist in refining the role of IO in each considered COA. In an effort to stay ahead of the planning process, the IO planners can begin selecting the applicable IO elements and capabilities and correlating them to their respective IO sub-objectives. As depicted in Figure 6, the model continues developing the "Disrupt IADs" sub-objective, and "Destruction," "EW," and "PSYOP" are selected as elements that can be used to achieve this IO sub-objective.

Figure 6. Element and Capabilities Selection

Step 5 (CINC's Strategic Concept) is the proposed concept of operations for the plan, and is an expanded version of the COA selected in the Commander's Estimate in step 4. From an IO perspective, the IO cell now decides which particular element or capability will be used in support of a particular IO sub-objective and assigns it an appropriate tasks(s); thereby, completing the Objective to Task Model (Figure 7). Once again, in this particular example, EW (either in the form of conventional jamming or attack with precision munitions) has been selected as the element to be used to "Disrupt IADs." Note that on the Objective to Task Model, the IO cell might identify a task in which a capability to execute it does not currently

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exist. This type of task or requirement may be a prime candidate for the CINC's Integrated Prioritized List (IPL) or for Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC) consideration. The key here is that the IO cell should not restrict itself to using only current tools, but that it should generate and keep track of future requirements as well.



Figure 7. Objective to Task Model[23]

Step 5 is also the ideal time to use a Priority of Effort Matrix (Figure 8). The Priority of Effort Matrix can be used to decide which element or capability should be utilized in order to accomplish a specific IO sub-objective. It can also be used to help balance resources and to establish a priority of effort with regards to meeting the IO sub-objectives. As the table

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depicts, an element or capability can be assigned a primary (P1/P2) role in meeting the IO sub-objective or it can be assigned a supporting (S) role. Keep in mind that there might be times when an element or capability does not contribute to a sub-objective. There may also be times when an element or capability supports all sub-objectives, but for resource restraints, might have to drop from a P1 to a P2 level, or from a primary to a supporting role, or even be eliminated.

| CINC Objective | Deter Country X Aggression | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IO Objective | Reduce Country X Military Leadership's Confidence in its Armed Forces | | | | | | |
| IO Sub Objective | CA | PA | OPSEC | PSYOP | DECP | EW | DEST |
| Disrupt C2 | | S | S | S | P2 | P1 | |
| Disrupt IADS | | | S | S | P2 | P1 | |
| Reduce Morale & Loyalty | | S | S | P1 | P2 | S | |
| Exploit C2 | | | | S | P2 | P1 | |
| Publicize aging Cuban tech vs. US | | P2 | S | P1 | S | S | |
| Publicize lack of internal support | S | P1 | | P2 | | | |
| Reduce confidence in intel | | | S | P2 | P1 | S | |
| Publicize lack of external support | | P1 | | P2 | | S | |

Figure 8. Priority of Effort Matrix[24]

Another tool that can be of assistance to an IO cell in the development of its IO plan is an IO Synchronization Matrix (Figure 9). Now this paper's Objective to Task Model continued

to develop only one CINC objective. Keep in mind though, that as a normal model branches out, there will be numerous objectives and sub-objectives that will compete for the use of a limited number of resources. Even though the Priority of Effort Matrix helps correlate a specific sub-objective to a particular element or capability and establishes some sense of priority, there is still a possibility that an element or capability may become over tasked or may be in conflict with others. The IO Synchronization Matrix provides a "big picture" look at the employment of all the elements to ensure that their efforts are synchronized and not in conflict with one another.



Figure 9. Synchronization Matrix[25]

In Step 6 (CJCS Concept Review), there are no specific IO actions or products required. If necessary, the CINC's IO officer could assist in briefing the Joint Staff in Washington, D.C. on the role of IO in the CINC's Strategic Concept as part of the CJCS review.

PHASE III (PLAN DEVELOPMENT)

Once the concept has been approved, the planning focus of the IO cell turns to the development of a complete IO plan that will support the overall operational concept. Using the Objective to Tasks Model, Priority of Effort Matrix and the "big picture" outlined in the Synchronization Matrix as a basic foundation, the overall IO plan can be broken down into more detail in an effort to determine force requirements, assign tasks, and identify any conflicts or showstoppers. Developing this detailed plan across a timeline ensures coordination of all assets in the execution of the activities and functions associated with that particular element. For example, building upon the basic Psychological Operations campaign previously depicted in the Synchronization Matrix (Figure 9), the detailed Synchronization Plan (Figure 10) shows what PSYOP events are to take place, when they are to occur, and who is to be responsible for executing them.

# Psychological Operations Timeline

Figure 10. Detailed Synchronization Plan[26]

During this phase, the IO cell is also responsible for

producing an Information Warfare (IW) Appendix (Appendix 3 to

Annex C Operations) with its associated tabs.  The basic IW

appendix should be short, clearly state the primary missions of

each of the elements of IO, and provide the necessary guidance

to ensure that the elements are all working towards the

accomplishment of the stated IO mission.  Detailed execution

instructions for each of the elements should be provided in Tabs

A (Military Deception), B (Electronic Warfare), C (Operations

Security), D (Psychological Operations) and E (Physical

Destruction).  The IO officer has primary responsibility for

drafting the IW Appendix for the OPLAN, while the element

representatives in the IO cell develop their respective element tabs to the IW Appendix.[27]

In addition to drafting their own portions of the OPLAN, the IO officer and "element" representatives in the cell should work closely with other members of the joint staff (J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-6) to ensure that IO requirements and considerations are incorporated into all aspects of the joint plan. The IO cell will provide these staff members with the necessary inputs needed to incorporate IO into Annexes B (Intelligence), F (Public Affairs), G (Civil Affairs), K (Command, Control, and Communications Systems), and S (Special Technical Operations) as required.

PHASE IV (PLAN REVIEW)

The role of the IO officer and the IO cell in the plan review phase are similar to their roles in the concept development phase. At each level of review, the IO officer and cell members should review the changes, suggestions and concerns expressed in the review process and make refinements in the IO plan and element level plans. The IO officer and cell members should be proactive in ensuring that the review process includes consideration and coordination with other departments and/or agencies of the USG as well as multinational agencies and military forces as required.[28]

PHASE V (SUPPORTING PLANS)

The IO officer and other members of the IO cell should assist subordinate units in the development of supporting IO plans. Cell members should work closely with J-4 planners, subordinate units, and support agencies integral to the IO plan to ensure that all IO personnel and material support requirements are included in time-phased force and deployment data and promulgated in the time-phased force and deployment list.[29]

## INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

Crisis action planning, like deliberate planning, involves a structured process under the policies and guidance established in JOPES. In contrast to deliberate planning though, crisis action planning normally takes place in a compressed time period. Therefore, coordination of the IO plan is even more crucial than in deliberate planning. As the six phases of crisis action planning (Figure 2) are discussed, it will become evident that the IO process and products previously described in deliberate planning can be applied to the crisis action planning process as well. Table 2 summarizes the actions of the IO cell and provides a general guide to IO planning as an integral part of the JOPES crisis action planning process at the combatant command level. As with Table 1, this information may be adapted

as required for similar IO planning guidance at the subordinate

joint force and component levels.[30]

| PLANNING PHASE | JOPES | IO CELL PLANNING ACTION | IO CELL PLANNING OUTCOME |
|---|---|---|---|
| PHASE I | Situation Development | Identify planning information requirements as situation develops and provide IO inputs into CINC Assessment. | RFIs from an IO perspective and IO portion of CINC's assessment. |
| PHASE II | Crisis Assessment | Conduct IO systems analysis, assist in development of CINC's IO planning guidance to support overall operational planning guidance. | IO planning guidance and initial liaison with units and agencies that may participate in or support IO operations. |
| PHASE III | Course of Action Development | Assist in developing and evaluating COAs, determine applicable elements and tasks, and incorporate IO issues into the Commander's Estimate. | IO objectives and sub-objectives; Priority of Effort & Synchronization Matrix; and IO portion of Commander's Estimate. |
| PHASE IV | Course of Action Selection | Coordinate with subordinate units and supporting agencies on support preparations and plan development. | IO portion of overall plan approved through CJCS. |
| PHASE V | Execution Planning | Develop complete IO plan and coordinate with appropriate staff sections, operational units, and supporting agencies for each of the IO elements. | IW Appendix (with associated tabs) and IO inputs to Annexes B, F, G, K, and S as required. |
| PHASE VI | Execution | Monitor IO operations via established feedback channels and adapt IO objectives to support changing operational directives. | Execution checklist, and IO objectives modified as necessary to support changing operational objectives. |

Table 2.   IO Planning Related to Crisis Action Planning[31]


PHASE I (SITUATION DEVELOPMENT)

Although a crisis requiring a military response may arise

with little or no notice, there is usually a period of days or

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weeks over which indications and warning give planners notice of a developing crisis. Given that the situational development may shorten the time line for plan development, the IO officer and IO cell should meet to review indications and warning information as soon as possible and begin the process of concept development just as would be done in deliberate planning. Information planning requirements, existing operation plans, previous lessons learned, and exercise and historical IO plans should be screened for usefulness. In addition, the J-2 representative on the IO cell should identify IO intelligence requirements and forward requests for IO intelligence support.[32]

Keep in mind that adaptive planning calls for the development of a range of options that can be used in a crisis as the situation develops. One such approach is the use of Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs). FDOs underscore the importance of early response to a crisis. They are deterrence-oriented and carefully tailored to provide the right response at the right time. AFSC Pub 1 provides examples of Informational FDOs that can be used, as a situation develops, in order to defuse a crisis before it can escalate.[33]

PHASE II (CRISIS ASSESSMENT)

IO planning during the crisis assessment phase consists of mission analysis and the development of planning guidance as

discussed previously in the deliberate planning process.
Depending on the indicated urgency of the crisis, the IO officer
and "element" cell members should simultaneously begin working
with subordinate units and agencies to identify and prepare
personnel and material that may be required for IO operations in
support of a military response to the crisis.[34]

PHASE III (COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT)

This phase of crisis action planning is comparable to the
concept development phase of deliberate planning. During this
phase, the CINC develops and submits recommended COAs to the
CJCS and the NCA in the form of a Commander's Estimate. Using
the Objective to Task Model (Figure 7) and the Priority of
Effort and Synchronization Matrixes (Figures 8 & 9), previously
discussed, the IO cell will assist in developing and evaluating
the various COAs, in determining applicable elements and tasks,
and in incorporating IO issues into the Commander's Estimate.

PHASE IV (COURSE OF ACTION SELECTION)

While waiting for the NCA to select a COA, IO cell members
should continue to coordinate with subordinate units and
supporting agencies on support preparations and plan
development.

PHASE V (EXECUTION PLANNING)

Once a course of action has been selected and approved, IO cell planning efforts should focus on developing a complete IO plan and coordinating with appropriate staff sections, operational units, and supporting agencies for each of the IO elements. Just as they did in Phase III (Plan Development) of deliberate planning, the IO cell breaks down the individual functions and activities and produces a Detailed Synchronization Matrix (Figure 10) for each element. They will also produce the IW Appendix with its associated tabs, and provide inputs for Annexes B, F, G, K, and S as required. In addition, the IO officer and cell members should continue to monitor the unfolding crisis and track indicators, which could have an impact on information operations.

PHASE VI (EXECUTION)

During this phase, a military response is implemented and the supported commander conducts operations until the crisis is resolved. During the execution phase, the IO cell should focus on ensuring that IO operations evolve along with the overall operational objective. The IO officer should place heavy emphasis on focusing the elements of IO against specific IO objectives and on deconflicting individual IO actions with each other. In order to do this; the IO cell should establish some

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type of mechanism that allows it to monitor the execution and

progress of the IO plan. One such method is an Execution

Checklist (Figure 11). Although there are a variety of ways to

develop such a checklist, it needs to be specific enough to be

able to track events by time and sequence; yet, flexible enough

to be able to update and modify as changes occur in the overall

operations plan. The type of checklist used is not important,

what is important is the fact that a system needs to be

established by which the IO cell can receive feedback; thereby,

enabling it to evaluate the effectiveness of the IO plan and to

adjust the plan accordingly.[35]



Figure 11. Execution Checklist[36]

## THE NEXT STEP IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Information Operations is a reality today and in the future. It impacts societies, governments, and the range of military operations, and all levels of war. Implementing IO is a challenging task and the use of IO in peacetime or in conflict as a principal means to achieve JFC objectives requires an ability to integrate IO capabilities into a coherent strategy. Organizations and processes will be needed that are agile enough to allow for planning operations, deploying forces, and executing missions that exploit emerging technologies.

This paper has provided such a process. It has taken the next step in information operations by addressing IO planning requirements in relation to the deliberate and crisis action planning processes and by providing some tactics, techniques, and procedures that link IO doctrine to IO execution.

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## ENDNOTES

[1] Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Information Warfare; A Strategy for Peace...The Decisive Edge in War</u>, Pamphlet (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff),n.d., 1.

[2] Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Joint Doctrine for Information Operations</u>, Joint Pub 3-13 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Second Draft 2 July 1997), IV-4.

[3] Ibid., V-14.

[4] Ibid., I-19.

[5] Armed Forces Staff College, <u>Joint Information Warfare Staff Officer's Guide</u>, AFSC Pub 12 (Norfolk: U.S. Armed Forces Staff College, 1997), 2-9.

[6] <u>Information Warfare; A Strategy for Peace...The Decisive Edge in War</u>, 5.

[7] Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations</u>, Joint Pub 5-0 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 April 1995), II-20.

[8] <u>Joint Doctrine for Information Operations</u>, V-2.

[9] Ibid., V-5.

[10] Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)</u>, Joint Pub 3-13.1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7 February 1996), IV-1.

[11] <u>Joint Doctrine for Information Operations</u>, IV-3.

[12] Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>User's Guide for Joint Operation Planning</u>, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 September 1994), 6.

[13] <u>Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations</u>, I-9.

[14] <u>Joint Information Warfare Staff Officer's Guide</u>, 16-3.

[15] <u>Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W)</u>, V-1.

[16] <u>Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations</u>, III-2.

[17] Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, V-13.

[18] Armed Forces Staff College, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1997, AFSC Pub 1 (Norfolk: U.S. Armed Forces Staff College, 1997), 6-27.

[19] Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W), V-1.

[20] U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) IO Planning Model was used as the basis for the Objective to Task Model shown in Figure 7.

[21] Joint Information Warfare Staff Officer's Guide, 16-14.

[22] Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W), V-1.

[23] U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) IO Planning Model was used as the basis for the Objective to Task Model shown in Figure 7.

[24] Joint Information Warfare Staff Officer's Guide, 16-17.

[25] This is a copy of a Synchronization Matrix used by Second Fleet in JTFEX (Joint Task Force Exercise) '96.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance, CJCSM 3122.03 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 June 1996), C-147.

[28] Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W), V-4.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, V-12.

[31] Ibid., V-15.

[32] Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W), V-4.

[33] The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1997, 6-18.

[34] Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W), V-5.

[35] Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W), V-6.

[36] This is a copy of an Execution Matrix used by Second Fleet in JTFEX (Joint Task Force Exercise) '96.

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